Wednesday, December 18, 2013

Galway Gig Cancelled

Here's what happened



I'd already mentioned that we normally do a 2 maybe 2 and a half hour set.


In the meantime I was looking for other people to play a few tunes to fill out some more time. That said 10 hours is frankly ridiculous.

He responded a long while later.


Lovely..


Now for the record .. I went on some forum pages and asked what the going rate is for bands in Galway. It ranges between 400 and 800 for a normal 2(ish) hour set.

Naturally enough that was that. I told him we'd look for somewhere else.
Should have probably told him to go fuck himself..


Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Snake Oil, Flouride and Tesco Value Cancer


A little context before reading as this started out as a Facebook reply before it got too long. A friend of mine posted a blogpost poking fun at the snake-oil peddling/pseudo science aspects of the anti-fluoridation proponents. I responded with a fairly tabloidy news article just to illustrate the changing opinions relating to the issue. Primarily I wanted to show that the anti-camp has an argument above conspiracy and paranoia. A third party then rebutted my article so I felt compelled to defend my advocate position!

I posted the Indo article to: Illustrate that there may be a reason to be anti-fluoridation other than conspiratorial paranoia. Unfortunately the Indo don't do citations! But rather than post the articles and reports (the venue being facebook) I figured a news article would suffice. Instead all I did was give John a straw man to batter! I should make clear here that my own knowledge of the subject didn't go beyond that espoused by the snake oil brigade (flouride is a scary communist plot) and childhood classes on dental hygiene (Yay! flouride).

I intended in an off-hand way to balance Marc's (Alypius's) post. Bikini clad girls and new-age folk seemed an easy target and I am always inclined (as you know Marc) to go 'weeell yes.. but what if..." . So in the interest of avoiding the book review I was supposed to be doing I did a little reading and googling to discover if  there was a plausible case for anti-fluoridation (specifically in the sense of the mass-medication of water).

I found that there was. However, rather than posting a selection of links to academic reports and the like, I found an Irish news article that I thought this would serve the purpose "Hey.., is not all faith healing guru's". Also posting the indo article made sense because considering the affable tone of Marc's post it might've been interpreted as rude or bullish of me to go posting a host of  links on the cheery-fwendly-fwends-happy-smiles playground that is facebook. I generally prefer a softly-softly approach to debate and I like that kind of correspondance. It seemed to get pretty heated between Andrew and John and no-one wants to force anyone behind the barricades. In my opinion you have to be aware of the ego and pride of whoever your chatting if you want to change their mind. I hope that doesn't sound passive-aggressive. Its not meant to.

I should mention that it is pretty clear that the majority of scientific texts show that the intended levels of Fluoridation (WHO guidelines) are probably not harmful. Your links and argument helped show this. So that much is obvious, and I have no hidden agenda. However, as iterated in any of the comprehensive reports, measuring effects on entire populations is problematic. This is why many wealthy countries, who could otherwise afford it, don't do it - its legality is unclear in many jurisdictions. Legally and ethically  medication is administered on an individual basis largely because the heuristics are manageable i.e. there is dramatically simpler cause and effect trail (more on that later).

So anyway I'll reiterate my originally flippant and conversational aim ( I reread that and it looks like 'Controversial' I mean Con-ver-sat-ional!) : An anti-flouridation stance is rationally defensible and not the sole product of conspiracies and paranoia.
Here's a fairly haphazard selection of the material that I'd come across.

There’s loads of stuff on Dental Florosis here's one at random. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC27492/ You'll find lots more if you care to look.
Also I remember numerous kids with this growing up.. Little maggots gobbling toothpaste I presume ;) .. I knew one guy whose nickname was toffee teeth .. poor fella.

In the Interest of fairness: According to the Aussies switching to other methods of fluoridation will save the day .http://nhmrc.gov.au/_files_nhmrc/file/publications/synopses/Eh41_Flouridation_PART_A.pdf
 
Next we have WHO material on the long term negative effects of naturally occurring fluoride in the water: http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/fluoride_drinking_water_full.pdf
(It’s a massive doc so word search for keywords.)

Osteoporosis – Plenty of material but none of it too convincing and lots of conflicting results. The thing here is that Fluoride is sometimes used to treat osteoporosis. However some research shows it is effectively trading increased bone mass at a loss of actual strength. Here’s one:
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM199003223221203 

They are peer reviewed articles so forming an opinion based on their content is neither paranoia nor conspiratorial inclinations.

Cancer - Once again there's loads of scientific reports on carcinogenic contaminants in drinking water. Obviously Fluoride is way down the list in terms of threats. I find it funny that China don't fluoridate their water.. sure its full of arsenic courtesy of  their industrial revolution.. so you'd think they already have the inexplicable poisoning of their people covered! To be clear.. that's a satirical joke of which the snake oil merchants and 'woo peddlers' are the butt. ( Imagine a Stewart Lee style mock indulgent 'hehehe' here.)

As we know though, Carcinogens and toxins (fluoride being a toxin) work by gradual accumulation. Like Tesco chipper slogan 'every little helps' the rise of the Pink Robots (cancer). If I had the time or will I'd love to photoshop a Tesco logo replacing 'Tesco' with 'cancer.. every little helps'. *ahem* Pardon my sense of humour. I don't mean to be facetious but sometimes it can't be helped

Imagine tesco value cancer.. Or rather their 'everyday' range.. whew..

Here's a pretty nasty report on the effects of Fluoride production in a Commercial setting: http://oem.bmj.com/content/60/10/722.short In this case we're talking large and prolonged exposures.  But, as Fluoride is a toxic material, negative effects shouldn’t be surprising.  It’s certainly clear that within the W.H.O's parameters of 0.5 to 1.0 mg/litre fluoride isn't going to be causing cancer. For more on that see: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1518976/
The general toxicity of fluoride is well documented as I'm sure ye know http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842741301312X    This is also one of the reasons its legality is problematic in some countries. It is worth mentioning that there have been numerous accidents where water sources were overdosed. (Courtesy of Wikipedia)

Three outbreaks were reported in the U.S. between 1991 and 1998, caused by fluoride concentrations as high as 220 mg/L; in the 1992 Alaska outbreak, 262 people became ill and one person died. In 2010, approximately 60 gallons of fluoride were released into the water supply in Asheboro, North Carolina in 90 minutes—an amount that was intended to be released in a 24-hour period.

Once again public opposition is not merely down to paranoia.Shit happens. I've been living in Donegal for a year now and the rumours of extra bucket loads of Chlorine and Flouride being tossed into to the reservoirs whenever a dead sheep plops into the murk are common. I swear, my water tasted like antifreeze one week last spring! There was an awful stench of anecdotal evidence of it too.. kinda smelt like apricot. :)
Also there are a few biochemists and salubrious organisations that are against Water-fluoridation
The International Chiropractic Association (ICA) makes the point that Water Fluoridation must be proven safe before mass administration.http://www.chiropractic.org/?p=ica/policies#fluoridation  
That seems obvious. But, in terms of legally defensible proof, all we have are statistics that usually correlate i.e. less dental caries in populations where water is treated. (I heard a joke once in the vein of that old idiom ‘correlation does not equal causation’ that would be relevant here.) If you’re dealing with mass medication of the population phrases like ‘evidence suggests’ won’t be cutting the mustard!
For similar reasons Avid Carlsson, no less than a Nobel Prize winner, is against Fluoridation. He figures water fluoridation violates pharmacological principles.
Unfortunately his stuff is mostly in Swedish. (In fact it seems the Pro-fluoridation Zeitgeist is distinctly Anglophone thanks to the yanks - they just love their flouride. The majority of critical papers I’ve found have been in other languages.) Here’s Carlsson in English (screen grab):
Following this there are numerous political parties (cross spectrum but mostly green) which consider Fluoridation of water contrary to international law. For instance the UK greens have been arguing for years now that
[f]luoridation violates Article 35 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
Under Article 35 of the Charter, the right to health care includes the right to refuse health care, for whatever reason. It establishes the individual's right to receive particular drugs or treatments - or to prevent them from having such treatment administered against their wishes
.
There’s a lot more as ye can imagine.. dementia links in the Lancet etc. dodgy down syndrome links (mostly rebutted.., in fairness). My point is that once I did a wee bit of searching I found that opposition to fluoridisation is not, on the face of it, irrational or unreasonable. As you can see the strongest arguments against it are political, ethical and philosophical. The scientific arguments are inconclusive in terms of the negative effects if not the positives. In my opinion mass medication, even assuming you aren't ethically or politically opposed, is not like the individual in the court of law: innocent until proven guilty. Biochemical and pharmaceutical compounds are usually considered, for want of a better phrase, guilty until proven innocent. And I mean in a real world context. Hence my opinion that Fluoride is suitable for addition to toothpaste where the heuristics of testing it are manageable. Administering it to a nation-state (once again this is my opinion) is unpredictable and fragile (I use that word with Taleb's import)

So, in my very recently formed (and still flexible) opinion the host of countries who have phased it out of water treatments are behaving sensibly, rationally and ethically. That's not to say fluoridation of water is unethical in countries where it is practiced. It stands to reason that the motivations are ethical in both positive and negative cases if the general population and government considers it so. If further conclusive reports paint a clearer picture I’m sure it could easily begin to be reinstated. The Zeitgeist is fickle mudder.

I was going to post this on my Facebook page but I’d be mortified if a faith healer or some other header shared it.
PS.

John
If I’d expected a blow by blow rebuttal I wouldn’t have thrown you a straw man (the indo article). You battered it manfully! As I said above I just wanted a summary article to show that there is another side. Its not just hippies and newage chakra-guru-slacktivist-facebookers.  Incidentally Wikipedia have a page on Fluoridisation by country that I assume you’ve seen. It’s pretty clear that, outside of the English speaking world water fluoridisation has fallen out of fashion over the years. It seems more sensible to me to put it in salt but that is another issue – water Fluoridisation is the issue. This is neither here nor there because I agree that the Indo article is weak but the journalist wrote it in 2000 when Wikipedia and Google.Translate were not available so who knows her source of misinformation.

John, I’m going to finish with a Bertrand Russell allegory that works as a mischievous joke in this context  (I think you know it Marc) : 

"Imagine a turkey that has lived for 1000 days on a farm, well fed, with proper shelter, playing with the farmer’s children and so on. The turkey has reason to expect, based on its historical experience that this will go on forever – the 1001st day, the Thanksgiving, not being an exception."

One man’s 30 years feeling fine won’t cut it if your defending mass medication!

If you are going to take issue with this post by all means reply. I’d appreciate if you respond to my argument specifically as I am partially convinced of the dental benefits of water flouridation so delivering me links singing its praises won't add to what you've already achieved in your respective posts. In other words explain to me why my impression; that anti-flouridation isn't just for headcases, is false.

To be honest I'm still unsure how to feel about it ethically and that is an issue I'd also be happy to debate. So feel free to convince me of that too.

I love debates so long as there isn't too much testosterone flowing and there's no tar and feathers. That's why I felt the need to check for anti-flouride materials in the first place.
 
Regards and good-will
Roger.

I had good craic writing this .. Got an extension on the book review too! Woo hoo.

Monday, February 7, 2011

Second Year Lectures

Introduction to seminars and Wolfflin lecture here

Content analysis and Panofsky here

Clement Greenberg's brand of Modernist Formalism here

T.J. Clark and his social history of art here



Sunday, January 30, 2011

High Order Thoughts

This will hopefully be a quick post to finish my ideas on David M. Rosenthal.
Opinions culled from 'Consciousness and Mind'

Consciousness and MindTo recap he’s a philosopher who figures that verbally expressed thoughts must be ‘High order thoughts’ (HOT’s). These HOT’s are literally an agent thinking about a mental state he or she is in. ‘Desire, doubt, anticipation’ inclination, expectation wondering etc.’ all constitute high order thoughts. 



Here is a useful distinction: The sensual experience of ’coldness’ is a mental state whereas the desire to be warm constitutes a HOT (semi-intentional pun). This means we can imagine a ‘dumb’ animal feeling cold and doing its best to find warmth by implementing other mental states all without out ever actually having the HOT of desire to be warm. While Rosenthal’s theories are materialist they leave room for all kinds of qualia and jigger pokery among humans (or less dumb animals!)

As detailed before, Rosenthal breaks mental states into two positions with a third (potential) conditional feature.

1.      1. State consciousness, which refers to a mental states being conscious.
2.      2. Transitive consciousness, which refers to an individual being conscious of something.
3.       3.The Magic ‘Transivity principle’. This is where mental states are conscious by virtue of one being in some way conscious of them.

This transivity principle is the clause whereby Rosenthal can establish that verbally expressed thoughts are automatically conscious. Meaning the process of a certain reception of stimuli becomes consciously available because you somehow perceive their results. Think bootstrapping your mind.

Here I gave an analogy with a cat and mouse that went like this:

Think of a mouse and his perception that a cat lies in wait outside his hole. We would assume that the mouse is responding to sensory stimuli which point to the presence of our exo-orifice kitty cat. We would not assume the mouse is in possession of a HOT that inveigles a sense of expectation that there is a Tom to his Jerry lucking outside the hole. We assume the mouse is reacting, the way natural selection intended, to the smell or other signals that signify the presence of a predator. At a push however, would we be so sure that Tom doesn't harbour a HOT of desire that the mouse might wander out? Rosenthal attempts to establish that when thoughts are expressed verbally this questions answer becomes conclusive. A hungry human in the predatory role of our cat could easily prove its possession of HOT’s by merely verbalising it.
So what happens in the verbalising human mind?

Let’s imagine a more passive scenario:

Here we have a not-so hungry human named Sarah sitting on a chair looking out a window. Her visual system (eyes, sensory cortex and all that gunk) perceives dark clouds on the horizon. The ensuing data is managed by neurological structures causing a first order thought; an incommunicable nonconscious sense of ‘yuck rain’. The High order thought now may brew (depending on circumstances, attention span etc.) to activate a desire to avoid getting wet. At this juncture Sarah, by virtue of a desire to avoid rain, may express the first order thought with a shake of the head and statement ‘it’s going to rain’. This means the verbally expressed (first order) state of ‘yuck rain’ is conscious while the HOT may or may not be. Equally if Sarah sincerely pronounces ‘I think it’s going to rain’ she has effectively proven that she comprehends that her mental state is occupied by a high order thought and that she knows about it. In both cases the agent desires to avoid getting wet and is therefore state conscious and having a HOT. In the second case the state is transitive not because of the illocutionary performance of ‘I Think’ but because it is an illocutionary performance i.e. the transivity principle has been engaged by the illocutionary force of ‘I think’.

Think about it! It actually does make sense. Just try not to get hung up on the word ‘conscious’ which has far too much semantic wrigglness to it. ‘Consciousness’ is a stinking and slippery wet fish.
Now we can also establish that expression, not just verbal, encourages transitive states. These states allow analysis of one’s own thoughts and perceptual systems. It seems communicative action is pretty much the cornerstone of the Cartesian proposition.

Fred Dretske (1993) wanted to tackle the idea that what makes a state conscious cannot be consciousness of the state. His idea went something like this:

Sam meets Tom on Monday. They chat for a while in clear view of each other. They meet again on Friday in similar circumstances. On Monday Tom was sporting a moustache which he had shaved off by the time of their second meeting. After the second encounter it turns out that Sam hasn’t noticed that Tom has shaved. However we know that he has seen the moustache on Monday and seen none on the Friday (he just hasn’t noticed what his eyes have seen). The second encounter did not include a moustache but despite this conscious difference Sam is unaware. 

I’m not concerned with Dretske’s conclusions here, what interests me is the weakness of the transivity principle in the prescribed interaction. Remember that the transivity principle is what allows you to become aware that you are actually having a HOT. In the Sam/Tom moustache story there was no occurrence of the transivity principle to make Sam notice the disappearance of facial hair.

So Sam doesn’t consciously notice the moustache but it still constituted a mental state; his eyes saw it! This mental state of moustache viewing may become a HOT of inclination that one is superior to those sporting the moustachioed aesthetic (Sam doesn’t have to notice the tache, he might just walk away feeling superior without realising why). It would be unlikely for one to glean self-judging awareness of one’s own shallow apprehensions about facial hair i.e. reach a transitive state of inclined superiority. Hence, even more unlikely to have ones consciousness sufficiently raised to notice the absent moustache at a later meeting i.e. purely on the weight of a transitive awareness of the HOT of superiority.

I started to think how we might amend the scenario so that Sam is fully aware of Tom’s tache. What if the transivity principle is extended by communicative action (i.e. talking, writing, pictograms, morsecode, cave paintings etc.)?

From the ground up let’s imagine Sam’s sensory activity which allows him to appreciate the visual contrast of the moustache. Let’s decide that based on the relevant socio-psychological factors Sam visual reception of the moustache conjures up a first order thought of negativity; ‘yuck moustache’. Sam now has a HOT of jealousy because he feels socially threatened by Tom who it turns out looks good with the moustache! From this point on any semantic segment of Sam’s HOT of jealousy (or related HOT’s) may be raised to a transitive state by the transivity principle. Let’s imagine two such scenarios remembering that it’s this principle that is the potential deliverer of phenomenal awareness of the downstream cognition that eventually amounted to jealousy.

In a first scenario Sam verbalises his HOT of jealousy by poking fun at his appearance when he’s not around. Haha have you seen Sam recently?  He has a shit moustache. Depending on the social backlash it is unlikely that this will serve to make Sam aware of his jealousy it will however make him aware of the first order visual experience and when they meet again Sam will almost definitely notice that Tom has shaved.

Let’s us imagine a second scenario where the scope of the transivity principle is extended. In this version Sam refers to Tom and his new facial hair in a written note to a colleague. Haha have you seen Sam recently?  He has a shit moustache. In jest the colleague posts it on a bulletin board. Wouldn’t the likelihood of Sam noticing the petty intent he has shown increase the potential of his jealousy reaching a transitive state? Imagine the slight became a viral email; wouldn’t this further empower the transitive principle? On viewing the note on a social networking site it’s plausible that Sam would acknowledge his own shallow behaviour and maybe even perceive his socio-psychological prejudices.

So it seems that when we externalise our high order thoughts it increases our chances of became existentially aware!

I have to admit I’m cautious about this, surely inane facebook comments aren’t key to a qualia riddled sense of self-awareness!? My intuition leaves me thinking something different. It may come off as cryptic (at least till I make some more posts) but here goes...

The more we outsource the calculations inherent to metacognitive awareness into the epigenetic niches of culture the more we relax selection on the innate cognitive architectures that allow us to appreciate phenomenal awareness without the cognitive scaffold which culture reciprocally gifts us.

I’m too tired to simplify that brute of a sentence.

Friday, October 1, 2010

Do Androids Dream of The Chinese Room Argument?

I meant this post to be more Rosenthal and the primacy of 'verbally expressed thoughts' but I've run into that old chestnut: The Chinese Room Argument.


This famous beast was originally designed to shoot down 'strong AI' (the artificial creation of  intentionality). John Searle put it to paper in 1980 and it's been argued up and down for the last 30 years. 

Searle suggests we imagine him locked in a room with a batch of Chinese lettering. These symbols are meaningless oriental squiggles to Searle who couldn’t deliberate between them and Japanese script. Following this Searle is provided a box of English instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols. Once these have been examined by Searle, fluent Chinese speakers begin to insert what are to him incomprehensible strings of symbols. Searle is unaware that these are in fact questions, but by following the English instructions he begins to convey the correct answers by sending out the original batch symbol by symbol.

The implication is that the people outside could satisfactorily deduce the system inside is comprehending Chinese. Of course Searle, the processor of the system, has no comprehension of Chinese what-so-ever. Therefore Searle argues if a man following instructions (a program) processes input for an informative output he has no actual comprehension of the material itself then why assume a digital computer would.

Seem reasonable? No!

I can understand why this has had such a tough reputation but I have to admit it puzzles me that it wasn't critiqued more aggressively at least in the 80's. Anyway let's give it a go.

My own criticism of the Chinese Room would underline Searle’s perception of the comprehension of language as the problem. The Chinese room argument both undermines its power and its source. Like a machine I learn that sounds and vocal inflections signify objects, actions and all manner of conditions in the real world, this makes me fluent in a language. Like a biological self replicating gene machine i feel compelled toward communicative action, an action that amidst the Human animal has allowed me to conceive of myself existentially.

Following this it seems to me that what is actually at the root of the Chinese room argument is a latent qualia argument. Searle intimates that while a computer program might have fluency in the semantics and syntax of a communication system it doesn’t really understand. I would argue in that case I don’t really understand these words I type; I am merely making use of an established set of symbols and values.One might say; "Inside my head I speak Quali-ish but I have this database that allows me to appear as if i speak a material language to the outside world..., good trick eh?"

Lets turn it on its head:

I'll imagine my everyday agency and interaction with the physical world as analogue to the Chinese room argument. The unconscious processor(s) in my brain manipulate incomprehensible chaotic stimuli (Chinese lettering) in relation to the accretion of indigenous and externally assimilated information (English instructions and their implementation) in order to successfully engage phenomenally with the big bad world (Chinese answer). Either I'm a freakish zombie-send-Rick-Deckard-after-me-android or it turns out Deckard and everybody else are too so we can relax and pretend to learn Chinese to our hearts content.

Logically I think this makes Searle's argument a dud.

Instead of dwelling upon the fact that a processing machine in the place of Searle might not understand Chinese why not marvel at the power of the deception? Why not examine the power of the calculating system? How strange that one human animal can establish a blind system so that another individual can process questions into answers without even a rudimentary comprehension. Neither biological nor artificial intentionality are the interesting factors in the Chinese room. It is the inanimate system of calculus that exists outside the heads of our actors that provides the most interesting anomaly. We have reached a juncture in human evolution where we can establish systems that can be processed without comprehension. We (as our sentience might pluralise) are just processors favoured by natural selection to increasingly externalize our memory and cognitive operations.

So in the end Searle's argument makes a handy intuition pump for its own antithesis!



John. R. Searle: Minds, brains, and programs. (Cambridge University Press,1980)

Sunday, September 26, 2010

Why Are Verbally Expressed Thoughts Conscious?


This is a seemingly innocuous question which David M. Rosenthal attempts to answer in a paper of the same name. I decided to look at this because of my suspicions that intentional communication is key to our conscious perception of mental states (and our intuitions that in itself is metaphysical or irreducible).

Beware treacherous waters ahead!

I've had a lot of trouble with this one. The man starts of easy but once the ball starts to role he uses the most convoluted rhetoric arguments. Maybe it's me that's been unusually dense these last few days but this stuff had me dizzy and frustrated; rereading every second line and generally uncomfortable from end to end. Anyhow I'll dig in:

I'm going to quickly explain Rosenthal's definition of so called 'High Order Thoughts' (HOTs), these play a big part and are integral to his explorations of consciousness. Basically a HOT is thinking about thoughts. Put differently it is the examination of sensually perceived information. So desire, doubt, anticipation, inclination, expectation, wondering etc. all constitute high order thoughts in Rosenthal's model.

When we think of a mouse and his perception that a cat lies in wait outside his hole we would assume that the mouse is responding to sensory stimuli which point to the presence of a cat outside the hole. We would not assume the mouse is in possession of a high order thought that inveigles a sense of expectation that there is a Tom to his Jerry lucking outside the hole. At a push however, would we be so sure that Tom doesn't harbour a HOT of desire that the mouse might wander out? Rosenthal doesn't put so fine a point on it, but the possibility of non-humans high order thoughts are not written off.

At this point I feel the need to point out my reservations of the definition of HOT. Obviously there is a separate order of intentionality between response to stimuli and a critical appraisal of that response but I can't see this as being how cognition works. Surely there is a spectrum of intensity attaching my HOT (desire) of food and the cat's lower order thought that its prey is present in is hole. Now you'd expect Rosenthal might be inclined to place a threshold of consciousness upon my suggested spectrum as the signifier or even the cause of these high order thoughts. But no, consciousness plays a different peripheral role in proceedings.

In Rosenthal's work consciousness is not just the phenomenon being investigated it also serves in the explanation. The delineation is as follows; an individual may be conscious of something and sometimes a mental state may be conscious. In other words a mental state may be conscious but you may not be conscious of it! Rosenthal refers to the conscious mental state as 'state consciousness' and to an individual conscious awareness of something as 'transitive consciousness'.

After these Rosenthal has one more condition on his use of the term consciousness, the 'transitivity
principle'. This is where 'mental states are conscious only if one is in some way conscious of them'. Meaning the process of a certain reception of stimuli becomes consciously available because you somehow perceive their results. I might be inclined to think of this in terms of 'pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps' an implausible act of levitation that seems an easy metaphor for this transivity principle. These are tricky principles and definitions but it seems Rosenthal has gone to arduous lengths in order to fit them in with his wide ranging theories of consciousness. For now I'll assume their unwieldiness s necessary!

Now I'm ready for the original premise of this post but it seems my will to type has left maybe tomorrow..

Saturday, September 18, 2010

Property Dualism, De Selby and a Neuroscientist Named Fred.


A few quick few words (hopefully) on a plausible kind of Dualism. Opinions formed reading John R. Searle.

So what is property dualism?

To begin, the original brand of dualism (Cartesian) was a theory of mind which suggested that what we experience as consciousness is not a physical property of the universe. Hence the duality.., Mind separate from body. As can be surmised, this fits with all kinds of theological arguments and was prevalent in many guises for a long time.

Property dualism came along and reframed this intuition in light of the 20th century’s acceptance that the brain is a biological mechanism. Consciousness still had to be something ‘over and above’ mere biology. This savvy dualism proclaimed the existence of a singular physical realm that had two properties, one physical, the other an irreducible mental property. So we can say that the lynchpin of this argument is that this ‘mental property’ of matter is irreducible to physical components while being manifest in them. This weird little effect coined by Donald Davidson is called ‘supervenience’ (I think it’s like intervention except with ‘super’ hack-sawed onto the front). For property dualism it means that all the molecules and bits and pieces that make up your brain amount to the phenomenal property of consciousness which then has the power to supervene upon what it is manifest in, namely in the magical result: agent causation (you consciously making something happen).

Generally property dualism amounts to two divergent world views. One which finds the universe causally closed. Outside of pure philosophical sophistry this means only physical things can make things happen in the physical world therefore the magic mental properties in your mind can’t actually make things happen i.e. causally closed. The other kind of property dualism sees the physical domain as causally open. Meaning that what feels like self-awareness allows you to make things happen.

Now for the criticism:

(Because I’ve been consistently thinking in terms of a materialist consciousness it’s actually taken me ages to force my head through the wringer and actually accept property dualism’s arguments without just thinking ‘this is quasi religious muck, maybe I’ll make some tea..’. In the end however I’ve started to see the merits in particular with the ontology of consciousness and the irreducibility of same.)

Why ‘dualism’ specifically? Why not trio-ism or quadrology? Why break consciousness into ontological categories at all? Its only duality in consequence to the linguistic hangover from enlightenment philosophy. To me it seem to come from a time when the universe was constituted of four elements and humours took care of your mental wellbeing (Makes me think of De selby in The Third Policeman , ‘accretions of black air as an explanation of darkness’). Our modern property dualist thinks ‘well I intuitively know my consciousness is special but I can equally see that neuron firings can amount to motor skills, therefore I must amend the philosophy of the mind (Cartesian Dualism) that conforms to the former while tweaking it in reaction to the latter’. It’s actually a little annoying that philosophy is still banging about with this kind of language, doffing its cap to a historic education. In the intervening period the other sciences got to quarks and bosons while philosophy still plays scrabble with the same old concepts and words. The worst part is that these scrabble players are often geniuses but because of the language they use, philosophical consensus upon theories of mind always run into dialectic dead ends.

Once I finally get round to biting my indignant (materialist) tongue we can get to the real bones of the theory. Consciousness has no causal super powers that can’t be assigned to neurobiological factors. BUT this reduction does not lead to a proof where the neuroscientist (let’s call him Fred) can say that the patient who’s he’s just scanned is conscious in the same way that Fred feels he is. Fred’s patient could still be a Chalmersesque Zombie. This means consciousness is causally reducible but it appears to be ontologically irreducible. Fred knows that being Fred can’t be reduced into something that can be communicated and phenomenologically experienced by someone other than Fred.

Now if we take a leaf out of Dennett’s work we might stray into hypotheticals. Imagine we could quantify all the information (as it occurs during a singular moment) in Fred’s brain; imagine too that we could quantify the very neural architecture of Fred at that very moment. Now imagine that we upload this transcendental string of binary into a suitably large computer of silicon switcheroos (or whatever). Dennett would say that what we have is a mirror image of Fred courtesy of an ontological reduction. Maybe we could even run the program and have carbon based Fred talk to silicon based Fred; they would both at least retrospectively understand on an existential level what it was like to be Fred before the moment of replication.

Can you guess what happens next? Turns out Carbon based Fred is a property dualist and what does he go and do, but doubt silicone based Fred has any qualia! Bang! Dialectic dead end. Dennett’s argument is screwed, maybe unfairly but screwed none the less. If Fred doesn’t believe the new Fred then consciousness is ontologically irreducible. In fact if you are dualistically inclined at all this whole thought experiment is useless. The fact that carbon based Fred can be right or wrong kind of proves ontological irreducibility. On a curious aside it’s actually frighteningly like superposition (or even transubstantiation depending on your taste).

In Wittgenstein-ish terms you can’t experience pain in someone else’s body. In order to do it you’d have to get inside their head which is made of their neurobiology and nerves so you would in fact be them. So Instead you carry over your own Neurobiology in some kind of transplant but then your reception of the pain would be processed the way you process pain; the premise is absurd.

So it seems if you accept the terminology you have to accept ontological irreducibility. But if we try to retrace the steps of the argument up to a conclusion of property dualism you realise it doesn’t work that way. The whole thing was built from the top down. Irreducibility does not lead to any kind of metaphysics or duality. For the sake of comprehension lets say that the qualia of ontological irreducibility have a special colour assigned to them (lets say blue)  alternatively the zombic lack of qualia is signified by a a different colour (green). Now within this analogy the middle ground of turquoise is where all the philosophical debate should occur, i.e.when does one stop and the other begin. Lets decide that the question of causality (not whats its like but what it is) is analogized numerically x+x=y. What dualism does is decide to give the y value a colour (y),(y)or (y) which wrecks the equation and if you play by the rules renders it unsolvable. I guess it kind of an apples and oranges thing.

If we were to look at things a little more cynically this irreducibility becomes a free standing tenet that’s only purpose was to hold up a statue of Descartes. RenĂ©’s been knocked off It since, but modern dualists can still dodge the rude pot-shots of materialists and teleofunctionalists by standing behind it. Materialists can stand behind it too; one can’t know what it’s like to be someone else and with the same unproductive sentiment one can’t know what it’s like to not be a ‘one’. Nothing is achieved just a sort of stalemate that Augustine or some clever theologian would’ve thrived upon.

John Searle seems to be a man in the middle. Here is a quote from a paper of his which sums up what is increasingly becoming a minefield of tautology.

“The property dualist wants to say that consciousness is a mental and therefore not physical feature of the brain. I want to say consciousness is a mental and therefore biological and therefore physical feature of the brain. But because the traditional vocabulary was designed to contrast the mental and the physical, I cannot say what I want to say in the traditional vocabulary without sounding like I am saying something inconsistent. Similarly when the identity theorists said that consciousness is nothing but a neurobiological process, they meant that consciousness as qualitative, subjective, irreducibly phenomenological (airy fairy, touchy feely, etc.) does not even exist, that only third person neurobiological processes exist. I want also to say  that  consciousness is nothing but a neurobiological process, and by that I mean that  precisely because  consciousness is qualitative, subjective, irreducibly phenomenological (airy fairy, touchy feely, etc.) it has to be a neurobiological process; because, so far, we have not found any system that can cause and realize conscious states except brain systems. Maybe someday we will be able to create conscious artifacts, in which case subjective states of consciousness will be “physical” features of those artefacts.”

That’s it, we’re done with the criticism. Here’s a little coda on the kind of property dualism that suggests that anathema causally closed world.

Property dualism has lots of different proponents and hence many different kinds of itself. One that has been around for a long time, and one that (despite being generally derided) I find surprisingly compelling posits epiphenomenalism. I think Thomas Huxley is the progenitor of this one; he has referred to consciousness as being akin to the whistle that comes from a steam train, it has no bearing or effect upon the actual functioning of the locomotive. Imagine that! Imagine all that clamour in your head amounting to a little ineffectual existential flatulence. My last post outlined something similar except I tried to imbed a little causation. I even came up with a grandiose phrase for it since, Epiphenomena with Asymmetrical Causation. Roles of the indignant tongue, eh? This sits well with the Modular stuff and the idea that social intelligence is running the cognitive show.

If I were to be very ambitious I might even say that the externalisation of information in culture and art might be the factor that allows epiphenomena to supervene in what in almost real time decisions. Of course it must be stated that the very architecture of our brains is in flux so epiphenomena of a reflexive social intelligence module are of course modulating the physiological properties of a mind in what would otherwise be a causally closed world.

That took longer than I expected...